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Abstract 
Fuzzy extractors convert biometrics and other noisy data into a cryptographic key for security applications such as remote 
user authentication. Leakage attacks, such as side channel attacks, have been extensively modelled and studied in the 
literature. However, to the best of our knowledge, leakage attacks to biometric-based remote user authentication with 
fuzzy extractors have never been studied rigorously. In this paper, we propose a generic framework of leakage-resilient 
and privacy-preserving biometric-based remote user authentication that allows an authorized user to securely authenticate 
herself to a remote authentication server using her biometrics. In particular, the authorized user relies only on her secret 
biometrics to perform a valid authentication — which is suitable for user authentications in a cross-platform setting. 
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1. Introduction 
Biometric-based user authentication has been widely used in many real-life applications such as mobile security, financial 
transactions and identification checks [1]. There are many attractive features using biometrics over conventional passwords. 
For example, people need to remember many secure passwords for various accounts and update passwords frequently for 
security reasons. By contrast, biometrics is permanently and uniquely associated to an individual, so it is convenient to use 
biometrics for user authentication. 
Biometric-based user authentication also leads to some security and usability issues. First, biometrics is not revocable. If 
biometrics is compromised, then user may loss its security forever, especially for the single-factor-based user authentication 
[2], [3], [4]. Second, authorized users may concern the security of biometrics stored on the authentication server. Therefore, 
no biometrics should be stored in plaintext at the server side, because biometrics may contain a wealth of personal 
information (e.g., DNA). 
There are mainly three methods to protect biometrics information: non-invertible transform [5], homomorphic cryptosystems 
[6], and fuzzy extractors [7]. The non-invertible transform relies on a secret key. Specifically, it is a two-factor  
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Fig. 1. Overview of biometrics-based user authentications. Server Bob maintains a database to store the enrolled information from all enrolled users, which 
includes user Alice with identity I D A . A secure sketch (i.e., an “encrypted” form of biometrics) is used to recover the original biometrics from a nearby 
biometrics.
(biometrics plus secret key) user authentication and not scalable for a cross-platform setting (see the example below). 
This is because the secret key must be available at the time of authentication to transform the requested biometrics for 
subsequent user authentication. Homomorphic encryption is a straightforward approach to protect biometrics, where a 
biometric-matching (i.e., searches user’s enrolled information from the backend database and makes a decision) is per-
formed by the server in ciphertext. As a result, the server can obtain an authentication result without revealing the user’s 
encrypted biometrics. However, it is not practical in a real-world environment (e.g., resource-constrained devices) due to its 
computational cost and system complexity [8].
In this work, we focus on biometric-based remote user authentication (BRUA) using fuzzy extractors that enables an 
authorized user Alice to authenticate herself to a remote server Bob using her biometrics. Specifically, Alice relies on her 
enrolled sketch stored at the server side in order to derive a public key for generating a certificate associated to a message 
(e.g., nonce). Bob then verifies the certificate based on Alice’s enrolled public key (see Fig. 1). We emphasize that no infor-
mation is stored locally at the user side, and no biometrics is stored in plaintext at the server side (i.e., biometric-privacy).
The BRUA with fuzzy extractors may be vulnerable to leakage attacks in the real world such as side channel attacks on 
computation time, power consumption, radiation, noise and heat emission. An attacker is able to obtain some imperfect 
information of the secret (e.g., biometrics) stored at either the user side or the server side. If an attacker is able to obtain 
imperfect/partial knowledge of a user’s biometrics, then the user’s security could be compromised, because the user may 
use the same biometrics multiple times across different authentication sessions. The main goal of this work is to design 
leakage-resilient biometric-based remote user authentication (LR-BRUA) with fuzzy extractors.
The number of authentication factors plays a critical role in the usability of user authentications. It is desirable that Alice 
treats her biometrics as the only secret information and uses it for user authentications. Specifically, the success of remote 
user authentication solely relies on her biometrics, which is suitable for user authentication where a user holds several 
devices (e.g., smart-phone and tablet) and accesses the same service provider from various platforms in a cross-platform 
setting. The advantage is that Alice does not need to store any other secret information (e.g., a secret key) in each of these 
devices. Therefore, another goal is to design a single-factor LR-BRUA using fuzzy extractors.
The single-factor LR-BRUA scheme with fuzzy extractors is significantly useful in real-world applications. We take mobile-
device users enrolling/logging in a cloud service provider as an example. User authenticity prevents impersonation attacks 
from any third parties, and biometric-privacy prevents an honest-but-curious service provider from revealing the authorized 
user’s secret biometrics. In particular, these attacks will not be successful under the leakage of secret information.
This work We introduce the concept of leakage-resilient and privacy-preserving biometric-based remote user authentication 
(LR-BRUA), such that an authorized user can authenticate herself to an honest-but-curious server using her biometrics. It en-
sures leakage resilience for any secrets involved in the system, while the biometric-privacy is held as well. Our contributions 
can be summarized as follows.
• Generic Framework. We introduce the first generic framework of LR-BRUA using fuzzy extractors in a single-factor setting, 
and prove that the proposed construction achieves leakage-resilient user authenticity and biometric-privacy.
• Ease of Use. The LR-BRUA is a single-factor user authentication (i.e., no storage for secret information is required at the 
user side), which is suitable for user authentication in a cross-platform setting.
1.1. Related work
Biometric-based authentication Biometric-privacy is a basic security requirement for biometric-based user authentica-
tion/identification [9–14], and the definitions of privacy are various. We notice that some works [9–11] claimed that the 
biometric is stored in plaintext at server’s database, and the privacy concern is the relationship between a user’s biometric 
and the user’s real identity (or pseudonym). However, the three-factor authentication (such as smart card, password and 
biometrics) formed an opposite research direction [15,16]. The proposed three-factor solutions provide an enhanced security 
to user authentication, because it takes biometrics as an additional secret for user authentication. One three-factor authenti-
cation was done by Fan and Lin [15], in which an efficient three-factor authentication with privacy protection on biometrics 
was proposed and formally proven in Bellare and Rogaway’s model [17]. Specifically, the biometrics matching is performed 
by an authentication server who is not able to access user’s plain biometrics.
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Table 1
A comparative summary of biometric-based user authentication. Biometric-privacy means no 
biometrics is stored in plaintext at the server side. † denotes the number of factors for au-
thentication. Lightweight Cryptography means the construction does not rely on homomorphic 
cryptography (e.g., Paillier encryption [21]).
Function/Scheme [2] [34] [19] [14] [11] [15] [4] [35] Ours
Biometric-Privacy     ×    
Leakage-Resilient × × × × × × ×  
†-factor Auth One Two One One Two Three One Two One
Lightweight-crypto    × × ×   
Biometric-based authentication/identification with biometric-privacy is extensively studied in the literature [14,18,19,4,
35]. For example, some well-known works [20,12–14] used the Paillier cryptosystem [21] as encryption primitive to protect 
user’s biometrics, and the biometrics matching is executed in the encrypted domain. Huang et al. [14] proposed a flexible 
biometric-based identification framework using Paillier encryption. They used garbled circuit [22] to efficiently and oblivi-
ously perform biometrics matching and retrieve the outcome of an authentication. Wang et al. [19] used invertible matrices 
as secret key to encrypt biometrics and the exact biometrics matching is executed in the transformed domain. However, 
authenticated users need to store those invertible matrices as secret keys, and these secret keys must be available at the 
time of authentication to transform the requested biometrics for user authentication. As we have discussed earlier, this is 
not suitable for a cross-platform setting.
Modelling leakage attacks Secret biometrics used in biometric-based user authentication is subject to leakage attacks. Micali 
and Reyzin [23] firstly introduced a leakage-resilient cryptography model to capture various side channel attacks. Specifically, 
an adversary is allowed to access a leakage oracle: adversary can query a polynomial time computable function f , and 
receive the output of f (x), where x is a user’s secret value. They also put some restrictions on f (x) such that the adversary 
is not able to recover the secret key x completely through the chosen function f , and the amount of leakage f (x) must be 
less than |x|. Later on, Naor and Segev [24] relaxed the restriction on f (x), and stated that the lower bound of leaked bits 
is confined to the minimal entropy of secret key x, namely, “noisy leakage” model.
Dodis et al. [25] proposed a general model: “auxiliary inputs”. Instead of a min-entropy requirement on the secret key 
x, it only requires the chosen leakage functions to be computationally hard to compute x given f (x). The adversary is 
allowed to obtain the leakage bits larger than the upper bound defined in the bounded/noisy leakage models, and the 
chosen functions f must be “hard-to-invert”. We note that leakage-resilient cryptography has been extensively studied in 
the auxiliary inputs model [25–28]. However, any leakage-resilient work did not address leakage attacks on the biometrics 
used in user authentications. We stress that leakage attacks on secret biometrics need to be investigated, as the biometrics 
could affect the success of user authentication.
Fuzzy extractor Fuzzy extractor (FE) is one of the promising approaches to construct a biometric-based (remote) user au-
thentication scheme. Juels and Wattenberg [29] introduced a type of cryptography primitive called “fuzzy commitment 
scheme”. It is particularly useful for biometric-based authentication systems, because its error-correcting technique can cor-
rect certain errors within a suitable metric (Hamming distance). Juels and Sudan [30] proposed another construction: “fuzzy 
vault scheme”. It is based on a Set distance rather than the Hamming distance used in [29]. Specifically, the fuzzy vault 
scheme randomly creates a secret k-degree polynomial p(x) during the sketch generation procedure. Given valid biometric 
information, a user can reproduce the polynomial and recover x.
Dodis et al. [31] formally introduced the notion of secure sketches and fuzzy extractors. They used biometrics to derive a 
cryptographic key for various cryptographic applications such as password-based authentication. They also provided concrete 
constructions of secure sketches and fuzzy extractors in three metrics: Hamming distance, Set difference and Edit distance. Li 
et al. [4] proposed an efficient fuzzy-extractor-based biometric identification protocol using a new fuzzy extractor. The new 
fuzzy extractor is Chebyshev distance based, which takes a real number string as input. Nevertheless, it is less error-tolerant 
than Hamming/Edit distance.
With regard to specific attacks on FE, Boyen et al. [3] introduced a notion called “robust sketches”. They also provided a 
generic conversion to tackle active attacks such that adversary modifies the public sketch (or helper data) and compromises 
the security of fuzzy extractors. Meanwhile, Boyen [2] presented another notion, namely, “reusable fuzzy extractor”. It states 
that user may produce multiple secret string and public sketch pairs using the same biometrics: (Ri, Pi) ← Gen(Bio) (see 
Section 3.1). Later, Canetti et al. [32] proposed the first reusable (and robust) fuzzy extractor from some low-entropy distri-
butions. In particular, their refined security of “reusable fuzzy extractor” states that secret string Ri remains secure even if 
all other secret strings R j ( j = i) are revealed. In Table 1, we compare our proposed solution with the existing closely-related 
works. It shows that our proposed solution is the first biometric-based remote user authentication with leakage-resilience 
and biometrics-privacy in a single-factor setting. We stress that the concern of false acceptance or false rejection is not the 
main focus in this work. This is because false acceptance/rejection is likely to occur due to various reasons. The accuracy 
of biometric extraction can significantly influence the authentication result (e.g., face recognition algorithms find difficulties 
in distinguishing twins). We note that these issues can be resolved by using multiple types of biometrics, such as finger-
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Table 2
Summary of notations.
Notation Definition
(pki ,ski) User i’ public key/secret key
(I Di , I D Ŝ ) Identity of user i/server Ŝ
dist(x, y) Distance between vector x and vector y
t ∈R+ Threshold value (positive real number)
B/C Biometrics/Encrypted biometrics
SS(x, r) Secure sketch
(R, P ) Secret/Public string pair
Ext(x, r) Strong extractor
H Collision-resistant hash function
print and iris [33]. For similar reasons, the existing works mentioned in this paper also do not take into account false 
acceptance/rejection for biometric-based authentication.
2. Security model
In this section, we present the system model and security model for biometric-based remote user authentication frame-
work.
Notation We denote the i-th session established by a user as iU , and identities of all the users recognized by 
i
U during 
the execution of that session by partner identifier pidiU . We define sid
i
U as the unique session identifier belonging to the 
session i established by a user U . Specifically, sidiU = {mj}nj=1, where mj ∈ {0, 1}∗ is the message transcript exchanged 
between users.
We say an oracle iU may be used or unused. The oracle is considered as unused if it has never been initialized. The 
oracle is initialized as soon as it becomes part of a group. After the initialization, the oracle is marked as used and turns 
into the stand-by state where it waits for an invocation to execute a protocol operation. Upon receiving such invocation the 
oracle iU learns its partner identifier pid
i
U and turns into a processing state where it sends, receives and processes messages 
according to the description of the protocol. During that phase, the internal state information stateiU is maintained by the 
oracle. The oracle iU remains in the processing state until it collects enough information to finalize the user authentication. 
As soon as the authentication is accomplished, iU accepts and terminates the protocol execution meaning that it would not 
send or receive further messages. If the protocol execution fails then iU terminates without being accepted. In addition, 
we present the commonly used notations (see Table 2) in this paper.
2.1. System model
A biometric-based remote user authentication framework consists of the following algorithms:
• Enrollment. This is a non-interactive protocol between a user and an authentication server over a secure channel. The 
user enrolls her identity I D , a reference biometric C (C ← SS(B, r)), and a public key pk to the authentication server. 
The randomness r is chosen at random by the enrolled user, and it is erased after enrollment. The enrolled user becomes 
authorized one after the enrollment.
• Authentication. This is an interactive protocol between an authorized user and an authentication server over a public 
channel. The user sends her identity I D and a certificate associated to a candidate biometric B′ (i.e., dist(B′, B) ≤ t) to 
the authentication server. The authentication server accepts it if and only if the certificate is verified as valid under the 
enrolled public key pk corresponding to I D .
2.2. Security model
We review the security model defined in [35], including user authenticity and biometric-privacy with leakage-resilience 
against auxiliary input models, which were used to capture an impersonator and an honest-but-curious server, respectively, 
with the help of leakage attacks such as side channel attacks.
2.2.1. Authenticity
The authenticity game between a probabilistic polynomial-time (PPT) adversary A and a simulator (i.e., challenger) is 
defined S as follows.
• Setup. S first generates user identities {I Di} (i ∈ [1, n]) and server identities {I D Ŝ j } ( j ∈ [1, m]) in the system. S
also generates biometrics information {Bi} for n users. In particular, S generates a set of secret/public key pairs 
{sk ji , pk ji }mj=1 for user i with respect to m servers. Eventually, S sends all enrolled users’ identities {I Di, I D Ŝ j } to A.
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• Training. A can make the following queries in arbitrary sequence to S .
– Send: If A issues a send query in the form of (U , i, m) to simulate a network message for the i-th session of user U , 
then S would simulate the reaction of instance oracle iU upon receiving message m, and return to A the response 
that iU would generate; If A issues a send query in the form of (U ′ , ‘start ’), then S creates a new instance oracle 
iU ′ and returns to A the first protocol message.
– Biometrics Reveal: If A issues a biometrics reveal (or corrupt, for short) query to user i, then S returns user i’s 
biometric information Bi to A.
– Secret Key Reveal: If A issues a secret key reveal query to user i with respect to server j, then S returns the secret 
key sk ji to A.• Attack. A wins the game if all of the following conditions hold.
1. Ŝ j accepts user i ( j = i); It implies pidsŜ j and sid
s
Ŝ j
exist.
2. A did not issue Biometrics Reveal query to user i;
3. A did not issue Secret Key Reveal query to user i with respect to Ŝ j ;
4. m ∈ sids
Ŝ j
, but there exists no sUi which has sent m (m denotes the message transcript from user i).
A is allowed to reveal user i’s secret keys {skwi } associated to w (w = j) servers. We define the advantage of an 
adversary A in the above game as
AdvBRUAA (λ) = |Pr[A wins]|.
Definition 2.1. We say a BRUA scheme has authenticity if for any PPT A, AdvBRUAA (λ) is a negligible function of the security parame-
ter λ.
2.2.2. Authenticity against auxiliary inputs
To model the leakage on biometrics and secret key against auxiliary inputs, we first define two classes of auxiliary input 
leakage functions below.
• Let How(bio) be the class of all the polynomial-time computable functions h : {0, 1}|bio| → {0, 1}∗ such that given 
h(bio) (for a randomly generated biometric information bio), no PPT adversary can find bio with probability ≥ bio . The 
function h(bio) can be viewed as a composition of qbio ∈N+ functions, i.e., h(bio) = (h1(bio), · · · , hqbio (bio)) where for 
all i ∈ {1, · · · , qbio}, hi ∈How(bio).
• Let How(sk) be the class of all the polynomial-time computable functions h : {0, 1}|sk| → {0, 1}∗ such that given h(sk)
(for a randomly generated secret key sk), no PPT adversary can find sk with probability ≥ sk . The function h(sk) can 
be viewed as a composition of qsk ∈N+ functions, i.e., h(sk) = (h1(sk), · · · , hqsk (sk)) where for all i ∈ {1, · · · , qsk}, hi ∈
How(sk).
We then present the leakage-resilient biometric-based user authenticity model (LR-BRUA), which is an extension of 
previous authenticity model. Specifically, we provide two leakage queries for A in the LR-BRUA model.
• Biometric Leakage: If A issues a biometric leakage query to user i (i.e., Obio(i)), then S returns f Bio(Bi) to A, where 
f Bio ∈How(bio), and Bi denotes the biometric information of user i.
• Secret Key Leakage: If A issues a secret key leakage query to user i (i.e., Osk(i)), then S returns f Sk(ski) to A, where 
f Sk ∈How(sk), and ski denotes the secret key of user i.
In the proposed leakage-resilient biometric-based user authenticity model, we let the adversary submit two leakage 
function sets FBio ⊆ How(bio), FSk ⊆ How(sk), where both FBio and FSk are polynomials in the security parameter λ, 
prior to Setup stage. During the LR-BRUA security game, A is allowed to access both biometrics leakage oracle f Bio and 
secret key leakage oracle f Sk adaptively. We require that f Bio ∈FBio, f Sk ∈FSk and we define the advantage of an adversary 
A in the LR-BRUA game as
AdvLR-BRUAA (λ) = |Pr[A wins]|.
Definition 2.2. We say a BRUA scheme has leakage-resilient authenticity if for any PPT A, AdvLR-BRUAA (λ) is a negligible function of 
the security parameter λ.
2.2.3. Biometric-privacy
The biometric-privacy game between an adversary A and a simulator S is defined as follows.
• Setup: S first generates user identities {I Di} (i ∈ [1, n]) and server identities {I D Ŝ j } ( j ∈ [1, m]) in the system. S
also generates biometrics information {Bi} for n users. In particular, S generates a set of secret/public key pairs 
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{sk ji , pk ji }mj=1 for individual user i with respect to m servers. Eventually, S sends all enrolled users’ identities {I Di, I D Ŝ j }
and user’s secret keys sk ji to A.• Training: A is allowed to issue Send queries and Biometrics Reveal queries to S with arbitrary sequence.
• Challenge: A randomly chooses two challenge biometrics (B0, B1) of a user I Di (possibly corrupted), with the condition 
that dist(B0, B1) ≤ t , and sends them to S . S simulates the reference biometrics of user I Di by either C∗b ← F(B0) if 
b = 0 or C∗b ← F(B1) if b = 1.
F denotes a (public) probabilistic algorithm, and A is not allowed to issue Biometrics Reveal query on reference bio-
metrics C∗b . Finally, A outputs b′ as its guess for b. If b′ = b, then S outputs 1; otherwise, S outputs 0. We define the 
advantage of an adversary A in the above game as
AdvBRUAA (λ) = |Pr[S → 1] − 1/2|.
Definition 2.3. We say a BRUA scheme has biometric-privacy if for any PPT A, AdvBRUAA (λ) is a negligible function of the security 
parameter λ.
2.2.4. Biometric-privacy against auxiliary inputs
If the adversary A reveals the randomness r used in the reference biometrics, then she can encrypt the two challenge 
biometrics B0 and B1 by herself using r and compare whether they are equal to the challenge ciphertext, thus win the 
biometric-privacy game trivially. To model the leakage on randomness r against post-challenge auxiliary inputs, we define a 
class of auxiliary input leakage functions and a leakage query for A respectively.
• Let How(r) be the class of all the polynomial-time computable functions h : {0, 1}|r| → {0, 1}∗ such that given h(r)
(for a randomly generated randomness r), no PPT adversary can find r with probability ≥ r . The function h(r) can be 
viewed as a composition of qr ∈N+ functions, i.e., h(r) = (h1(r), · · · , hqr (r)) where for all i ∈ {1, · · · , qr}, hi ∈How(r).• Randomness Leakage: If A issues a randomness leakage query to user i (i.e., Or(i)), then S returns fr(ri) to A, where 
fr ∈How(r), and ri denotes the randomness of user i.
In the biometric-privacy game against post-challenge auxiliary inputs model, A is additionally allowed to access user’s
Randomness Leakage oracle w.r.t. the randomness used in reference biometrics C∗b , and we define the advantage of an 
adversary A in the biometric-privacy game as
AdvLR-BRUAA (λ) = |Pr[S → 1] − 1/2|.
Definition 2.4. We say a BRUA scheme has leakage-resilient biometric-privacy if for any PPT A, AdvLR-BRUAA (λ) is a negligible 
function of the security parameter λ.
3. Preliminaries
In this section, we review the preliminaries and the building blocks that will be used in the proposed LR-BRUA generic 
framework.
3.1. Fuzzy extractor
A fuzzy extractor converts non-uniform data to uniformly random strings which can be used in cryptographic applica-
tions. A typical application of fuzzy extractor is to extract reproducible string from biometric information. The extracted 
string then is considered as a secret for user authentication.
Secure sketches and fuzzy extractors Secure sketch is a building block of fuzzy extractors. A secure sketch scheme takes noisy 
information x as input, outputs a sketch s which is an auxiliary string. Note that secure sketches and fuzzy extractors are 
applicable to various noisy data other than biometric information. Secure sketch schemes normally use error correcting 
techniques to recover x under s if and only if the given input x′ is statistically close to x. The sketch s can be published 
since it does not reveal much information about x. Let M be a metric space on N points with distance function dist :
M ×M →R+ = [0, ∞), where N= |M|.
Definition 3.1. A secure sketch consists of two randomized procedures (SS, Rec) with the following properties.
• The sketch SS takes x ∈M as input, and outputs a sketch s ∈ {0, 1}∗ .
• The function Rec takes an element x′ ∈M and a sketch s ∈ {0, 1}∗ as input, and outputs x if dist(x, x′) ≤ t.
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Fuzzy extractors extract some randomness from a noisy input x ∈M. Then, it can also be recovered from a given input 
x′ if x and x′ are statistically close. The difference is that fuzzy extractors return a uniform string, but secure sketch returns 
a non-uniform string.
Definition 3.2. A fuzzy extractor consists of two randomized procedures (Gen, Rep) with the following properties.
• The generation function Gen takes x ∈M as input, and outputs a string R ∈ {0, 1} and helper data P ∈ {0, 1}∗ such that
(R, P ) ← Gen(x).
• The reproduction procedure Rep takes an element x′ ∈M and helper data P ∈ {0, 1}∗ as input, and outputs R such that
R ← Rep(x′, P ) iff dist(x, x′) ≤ t.
Since secure sketch can reconstruct the original input from some given noisy data, it can be used to construct fuzzy extractor 
schemes. Generally speaking, a fuzzy extractor can be derived by using a secure sketch with a strong randomness extractor. We now 
review a generic fuzzy extractor construction from a secure sketch.
• Gen: Let SS be a secure sketch and Ext be a strong extractor. Given an input x, (P , R) ← Gen(x; r1, r2) such that
P ← (SS(x; r1), r2), R ← Ext(x; r2).
Note that r1 and r2 are secret and public randomness respectively.
• Rep: Given an noisy input x′ and P , recover the original input x ← Rec(x′, SS(x; r1)), then compute R ← Ext(x; r2).
3.2. Strong extractor with hard-to-invert auxiliary inputs
Definition 3.3. (δ, )-Strong Extractor (Ext) with Hard-to-Invert Auxiliary Inputs [27]. Let Ext : {0, 1}l1 × {0, 1}l2 → {0, 1}m, 
where l1, l2, m are polynomials in the security parameter λ. Ext is said to be a strong extractor with -Hard-to-Invert auxiliary inputs, 
if for all pairs (x, f ) such that x ∈ {0, 1}l1 and f ∈How() (see Section 2.2.2), we have
|Pr[A(r2, f (x),Ext(x, r2)) = 1]| − |Pr[A(r2, f (x),u) = 1]| < δ,
where r2 ∈R {0, 1}l2 , u ∈R {0, 1}m.
The leakage function f ∈How() can be interpreted as a composition of q functions f1, f2, · · · , fq , where q ∈N+ and 
f i ∈How(). And the following Lemma is obtained from [27].
Lemma 3.1. Let r2 ∈R {0, 1}l2 be chosen uniformly at random. For any pair (x, f )where x ∈ {0, 1}l1 and f ∈How(), no PPT adversary 
can recover x with probability ≥ 2 · δ given (r2, f , Ext(x, r2)), provided that Ext(x, r2) is a strong extractor with -hard-to-invert 
auxiliary inputs.
3.3. Generic fuzzy extractor with hard-to-invert auxiliary inputs
Definition 3.4. A generic fuzzy extractor with -hard-to-invert auxiliary inputs consists of two randomized procedures (Gen, Rep)
with the following properties.
• Gen: Let SS be a (reusable) secure sketch and Ext be a strong extractor with -hard-to-invert auxiliary inputs. Given an input x, 
(P , R) ← Gen(x; r1, r2) such that
P ← (SS(x; r1), r2), R ← Ext(x; r2).
• Rep: Given an noisy input x′ and P , recover the original input x ← Rec(x′, SS(x; r1)), then compute R ← Ext(x; r2).
The generic fuzzy extractor with hard-to-invert auxiliary inputs is derived from reusable secure sketch and (δ, )-strong 
extractor with hard-to-invert auxiliary inputs. We refer to [35] for the following theorem and its security analysis.
Theorem 3.2. The generic fuzzy extractor with -hard-to-invert auxiliary inputs is information theoretically secure if the (reusable) 
secure sketch is secure and the (δ, )-strong extractor with hard-to-invert auxiliary inputs is secure.
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IDi Ŝ j
Candidate :B′i Reference : (I Di ,pki, Pi)
I Di−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
Challenge : rS
ri ← Ext2(pki; rS )
Pi, rS←−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
Response : r′iBi ← Rec(B′i , Pi) iff dist(Bi ,B′i) ≤ t
Ri ← Ext3(Bi , r2)
(pki,ski) ← KeyGen(Ri)
ri ← Ext2(pki; rS )
r′c ← H(I Di ||rS ||r′i ||ri)
Erase all state.
r′c, r′i−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
r′c
?=rc ← H(I Di ||rS ||r′i ||ri)
Fig. 2. Authentication (public channel).
4. Proposed construction
Overview On a high level, a user extracts a secret/public string pair (R, P ) (P is also called helper data) using the Gen
algorithm of generic fuzzy extractor on a biometrics B, and derives a public key pk using a key generation algorithm. Then, 
the user sends (I D, pk, P ) to an authentication server for enrollment. During user authentication, upon receiving a helper 
data P from the authentication server, the authorized user obtains the original biometrics B iff dist(B′, B) ≤ t by running 
the Rec algorithm of generic fuzzy extractor, which can be used to perform the subsequent user authentications. We stress 
that the public key pk can be regarded as the key shared between a user and a server in order to ensure the authenticity 
of the user. We define two strong extractors with 1-hard-to-invert auxiliary inputs Ext1 : {0, 1}l1(λ) ×{0, 1}l2(λ) → {0, 1}m1(λ)
and 3-hard-to-invert auxiliary inputs Ext2 : {0, 1}l′1(λ) × {0, 1}l′2(λ) → {0, 1}m2(λ) respectively, and a generic fuzzy extractor 
with 3-hard-to-invert auxiliary inputs (Ext3 : {0, 1}l′′1(λ) × {0, 1}l2(λ) → {0, 1}m3(λ)) in the system. Let H : {0, 1}∗ →Zq be a 
collision-resistant hash function.
• Enrollment. An enrolled user i performs the following steps.
1. Generate a biometric information Bi ← {0, 1}l′′1(λ) and a secret/public randomness pair (r′1, r2) ← {0, 1}l1(λ) ×
{0, 1}l2(λ);
2. Compute the secret randomness r1 ← Ext1(r′1; r2);
3. Run the generic fuzzy extractor with 3-hard-to-invert auxiliary inputs to obtain (Pi, Ri) ← Gen(Bi; r1, r2), where 
Pi ← (SS(Bi; r1), r2) and Ri ← Ext3(Bi; r2);
4. Generate a public/secret key pair (pki, ski) by running the KeyGen(Ri) algorithm, which takes the secret string Ri
as input;
5. Send (I Di, pki, Pi) to an authentication server Ŝ j .
The user i derives a public key pki ∈ {0, 1}l′1(λ) from the secret string Ri (step 4). Accordingly, the authentication server 
Ŝ j takes public key pki as a shared secret key with user i.
• Authentication. The interaction between an authorized user i and an authentication server ̂S j takes place as follows (see 
Fig. 2).
– Upon receiving a request I Di from user i, the authentication server Ŝ j chooses a challenge nonce rS ← {0, 1}l′2(λ)
first, then computes a value ri ← Ext2(pki; rS ) and sends (Pi, rS) to user i.
– Then user i performs the following steps.
1. Generate a candidate biometric information B′i ← {0, 1}l
′′
1(λ);
2. Run the generic fuzzy extractor with 3-hard-to-invert auxiliary inputs to obtain Bi ← Rec(B′i, Pi) (Pi ←
(SS(Bi; r1), r2) if and only if dist(Bi, B′i) ≤ t and Ri ← Ext3(Bi; r2);
3. Compute the public/secret key pair (pki, ski) ← KeyGen(Ri);
4. Compute the value ri ← Ext2(pki; rS );
5. Choose a response nonce r′i ←Zq and compute a certificate r′c ← H(I Di ||rS ||r′i||ri);
6. Erase all state and send (r′c, r′i) to Ŝ .
– Ŝ j computes a certificate rc ← H(I Di ||rS ||r′i||ri) and checks r′c ?=rc . If it does hold, Ŝ j accepts user i; otherwise, Ŝ j
rejects her.
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4.1. Security analysis
Theorem 4.1. The proposed LR-BRUA achieves leakage-resilient authenticity (Definition 2.2) in the random oracle model if 2-hard-to-
invert auxiliary inputs is secure, and the generic fuzzy extractor with 3-hard-to-invert auxiliary inputs is secure, where 2 and 3 are 
negligible.
High-level discussion We clarify the motivation of each game before detailed proof. Game G1 is to prevent replay attacks; 
Game G2 is to capture an adversary, who is not allowed to reveal the biometrics of user i, aims to impersonate user i and 
authenticate to a server; Game G3 is to capture an adversary, who is not allowed to reveal the secret key of user i w.r.t. 
server Ŝ j , aims to impersonate user i and authenticate to server Ŝ j .
Proof. We define a sequence of games {Gi} and let AdvLR-BRUAi denote the advantage of the adversary in game Gi . Assume 
that A activates at most m sessions in each game.
• G0: This is the original game for leakage-resilient authenticity security.
• G1: This game is identical to game G0 except that S will abort if a challenge/response nonce (i.e., rS , r′i) is used 
twice by the server/user in two different sessions. Therefore, we have
∣∣∣AdvLR-BRUA0 − AdvLR-BRUA1
∣∣∣≤m2/2λ (1)
• G2: This game is identical to game G1 except that in the Attack session, S replaces the real value Ri by a random value 
R ∈ {0, 1}m3(λ) with regard to instance oracle iUi . Below we show the difference between G1 and G2 is negligible 
under the assumption that the generic fuzzy extractor with 3-hard-to-invert auxiliary inputs is secure.
Let S denote an adversary, who is given (r, f1(Bi), · · · , fqBio (Bi), SS(Bi; r1), Tb), aims to break the generic fuzzy extrac-
tor with 3-hard-to-invert auxiliary inputs. S simulates the game for A as follows.
– Setup. S sets up the game for A by creating n users and m servers with the corresponding identities {I Di, I D j}, 
where i ∈ [1, n], j ∈ [1, m]. S randomly selects an index i and guesses that if the “Attack” event will happen 
with regard to user i at server j. S sets the challenge reference biometrics as (I Di, pki, Pi) = [I Di, KeyGen(Tb),
(SS(Bi; r1), r)] (where (r1, r) are chosen by his challenger). In addition, S honestly generates rest user’s biometrics 
and their corresponding reference {(pkl, Pl)} (l = i). Eventually, S sends all the references (include (I Di, pki, Pi)) to 
A. It is obvious that S can answer all queries made by A except user i. Below we mainly focus on the simulation 
of user i only. Note that Tb can be either T0 = Ext3(Bi; r) or T1 ∈R {0, 1}m3(λ) , and secret key pair is defined as 
(pki, ski) ← KeyGen(Tb) with respect to server j.
– Training. S answers A’s queries as follows.
∗ If A issues a send query in the form of (Pi, rS ) to S , then S firstly chooses a response nonce r′i ; S then computes 
ri = Ext2(pki; rS ) and a certificate r′c = H(I Di ||rS ||r′i ||ri), and returns (r′c, r′i) to A.∗ If A issues a biometric leakage query to user i, then S returns f1(Bi), · · · , fqBio (Bi) as the leakage query outputs.
∗ If A issues a secret key query to an instance oracle iUi w.r.t. server j, then S returns ski to A.
If the challenge of S is T0 ← Ext3(B; r), then the simulation is consistent with G1; otherwise, the simulation is 
consistent with G2. If the advantage of A is significantly different in G1 and G2, then S can break the generic 
fuzzy extractor with 3-hard-to-invert auxiliary inputs. We assume a user i uses biometrics B at most n(λ) times for 
generating different references w.r.t. m servers, hence we have
∣∣∣AdvLR-BRUA1 − AdvLR-BRUA2
∣∣∣≤ n · n(λ) · AdvExt3S (λ)
• G3: This game is identical to game G2 except that in the “Attack” session, S replaces the real value ri by a random 
value R ∈ {0, 1}m2(λ) with regard to instance oracle iUi . Below we show the difference between G2 and G3 is negligible 
under the assumption that the strong extractor with 2-hard-to-invert auxiliary inputs is secure.
Let S denote an adversary, who is given (r, f1(pk∗), · · · , fqsk (pk∗), Tb), aims to break the strong extractor with 2-hard-
to-invert auxiliary inputs. S simulates the game for A as follows.
– Setup. S sets up the game for A by creating n users and m servers with the corresponding identities {I Di, I D j}, 
where i ∈ [1, n], j ∈ [1, m]. S randomly selects an index i and guesses that the “Attack” event will happen to user i
with respect to a server j ( j = i). S sets the secret public key of user i at server j as pk∗ . In addition, S honestly 
generates rest user’s biometrics and their corresponding references {(pkl, Pl)}(l = i) according to the protocol speci-
fication. It is obvious that S can answer all the queries made by A except user i at server j. Below we mainly focus 
on the simulation of such case. Note that S generates independent public/secret key pairs to simulate user i’s secret 
keys associates to other servers.
– Training. S answers A’s queries as follows.
∗ If A issues a send query in the form of I Di to S w.r.t. instance oracle iUi , S firstly simulates a helper data as 
Pi = ({0, 1}∗, r) (where r is chosen by his challenger); S then chooses a challenge nonce rS and returns (Pi, rS) to 
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A as the query response. Recall that A is not allowed to reveal biometrics Bi of user i, thus the simulation of such 
query is perfect.
If A issues a send query in the form of (Pi, rS ) to S , S firstly chooses a response nonce r′i ; Secondly, S sets ri = Tb
and computes a certificate r′c ← H(I Di ||rS ||r′i||ri); Eventually, S returns (r′c, r′i) to A as the query response. Note 
that Tb can be either T0 = Ext2(pk∗; r) or T1 ∈R {0, 1}m2(λ) .
∗ If A issues a secret leakage query to user i, then S returns f1(pk∗), · · · , fqsk (pk∗) as the leakage query outputs.∗ If A issues a biometric leakage query to user i, then S abort.
If the challenge of S is T0 ← Ext2(pk∗; r), then the simulation is consistent with G2; otherwise, the simulation is 
consistent with G3. If the advantage of A is significantly different in G2 and G3, then S can break the strong 
extractor with 2-hard-to-invert auxiliary inputs. Therefore we have
∣∣∣AdvLR-BRUA2 − AdvLR-BRUA3
∣∣∣≤ n ·m · AdvExt2S (λ)
• G4 This game is identical to game G3 except that in the “Attack” session, we replace the certificate r′c by a random 
value. Since we model H as a random oracle, if the replay attacks (w.r.t., G1) and impersonation attacks (w.r.t., G2, G3) 
did not happen, then we have
AdvLR-BRUA3 = AdvLR-BRUA4 (2)
It is easy to see that in game G4, A has no advantage, i.e.,
AdvLR-BRUA4 = 0 (3)
Combining the above results together, we have
AdvLR-BRUAA (λ) ≤ m2/2λ + n · [n(λ) · AdvExt3S (λ) +m · AdvExt2S (λ)] 
Theorem 4.2. The proposed LR-BRUA achieves leakage-resilient biometric-privacy (Definition 2.4) if the strong extractor 1-hard-to-
invert auxiliary inputs is secure, where 1 is negligible.
Proof. Let S denote an adversary who given (r2, f1(r′1), · · · , fqr (r′1), Tb), aims to break the strong extractor with 1-hard-
to-invert auxiliary inputs. S simulates the game for A as follows.
• Setup. S sets up the game for A by creating n users and m servers with the corresponding identities {I Di, I D j}, where 
i ∈ [1, n], j ∈ [1, m]. S honestly generates n user’s biometrics and their corresponding reference biometrics according 
to the protocol specification of Enrollment. In addition, S generates user’s secret keys with respect to m servers. Note 
that S can answer all the queries made by A using self-generated biometrics and associated secret keys during Training
stage.
• Challenge. Upon receiving the challenge request (i.e., B0, B1 of a user i) from A, S replaces the previously generated 
reference biometrics of user i by P∗b ← (SS(Bb, Tb), r2) (r2 is chosen by his challenger) and returns it to A. Note that 
Tb can be either T0 = Ext1(r′1; r2) or T1 ∈R {0, 1}m1(λ) , and pkb is perfectly simulated using the enrolled biometrics Bb . 
In particular, if A issues a randomness leakage query to user i, then S returns f1(r′1), · · · , fqr (r′1) as the randomness 
leakage query outputs. In the end, S outputs whatever A outputs. 
5. Conclusion
In this work, we have proposed a generic framework of leakage-resilient privacy-preserving biometric-based remote user 
authentication with fuzzy extractors. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first attempt to address leakage attacks on 
privacy-preserving biometric-based remote user authentication using fuzzy extractors in a single-factor setting. We have 
defined the formal security models for leakage-resilient user authenticity and biometric-privacy, and we have proved the 
security of the proposed generic framework under standard assumptions in the random oracle model. We leave the concrete 
construction of leakage-resilient biometric-based remote user authentication in a single-factor setting as our future work.
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